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The Curious Relationship of Marriage and Freedom 
Katherine Franke† 
 
Marriage is surely at a crossroad, as the chapters in this 
volume so richly attest.  In fact, marriage may be at more than one 
crossroad, some pointing toward new, uncharted terrain, while 
others amounting to intersections we have visited before.  My 
principal interest in exploring this dynamic moment in the 
evolution of the institution of marriage is to better understand why 
and how today’s marriage equality movement for same-sex 
couples might benefit from lessons learned by African Americans 
when they too were allowed to marry for the first time in the 
immediate post-Civil War era.  I find it curious that the right to 
marry, rather than say, employment rights, educational opportunity 
or political participation, has emerged as the preeminent vehicle by 
and through which the freedom, equality and dignity of gay men 
and lesbians is being fought in the present moment.   Why 
marriage?  In what ways are the values, aspirations, and even 
identity of an oppressed community shaped when they are 
articulated in and through the institution of marriage?  What kind 
of freedom and what kind of equality does the capacity to marry 
bring forth?    
I write this chapter just as same-sex couples have won the 
right to legally marry in the state of New York.  While there is 
much to celebrate in this victory, I am concerned that this new 
form of legal recognition for some members of the lesbian and gay 
community may come at a cost of rendering more marginalized 
and vulnerable other forms of family, kinship, and care (Franke 
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2011). Now that same-sex couples can marry, many employers 
have announced that they must do so in order to retain benefits to 
which they had previously been entitled without the legal sanction 
of the state (Bernard 2011)  “We can now treat you just as we treat 
heterosexual couples,” they say.  “Heterosexuals must marry to 
gain benefits for their spouses and children, you must now as 
well.”  
In important ways, what we are witnessing today with 
same-sex couples echoes the experience of another group of new 
rights-holders almost 150 years ago.   To better understand how the 
gay rights movement today has collapsed into a marriage rights 
movement, and what the costs of such a strategy might be, I will 
look backward in history to another time when marriage rights 
intersected with the rights of freedom, equality and dignity of a 
marginalized population: newly emancipated Black people in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  The experiences of formerly enslaved 
people in the 1860s with newly won rights to marry hold lessons 
for the gay rights/marriage movement today.   
 Since the birth of the same-sex marriage movement, 
advocates have argued that if miscegenation laws (laws prohibiting 
inter-racial marriage) were an unconstitutional form of race 
discrimination, then laws prohibiting same-sex marriage should 
amount to unconstitutional sex discrimination. Andrew Koppelman 
(1998) has made this argument earliest and most often. Indeed, this 
reasoning formed the basis of the first victory for the same-sex 
marriage movement in 1999 (Baehr, 1996) when the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii found that same-sex couples should have the same 
marriage rights as different sex couples. 
 This analogy never sat well with me.  I have long felt that 
before the gay and lesbian community committed to a civil rights 
strategy based on “if-they’ve-got-it-we-want-it,” we ought to 
undertake a little better due diligence about what “they” have 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950684
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before “we” insist on getting it too.  Don’t get me wrong, I am the 
first to admit that what motivates most opponents of same-sex 
marriage is a hatred or intolerance of gay and lesbian people, 
otherwise known as homophobia.   So too, I understand that many 
gay and lesbian couples want to get married.  Who can deny the 
pull of an institution that is so religiously, socially, legally and 
financially privileged, particularly as compared with the 
alternatives?  Even as domestic partnership and civil union laws 
increasingly equalize the financial and legal benefits that same-sex 
couples can get in lieu of marriage, they can’t match the respect, 
dignity and social meanings of being married full stop.    
 While I recognize why marriage matters so much to some 
members of the gay and lesbian community, I would have 
preferred if we, as a community, had paused before we invested so 
heavily in a politics of recognition, that is, in the blessing that the 
state can confer on relationships that meet its requirements for 
legitimacy. A recognition-based project of this sort provides few 
tools with which to transform or render more just the fundamental 
underlying norms by which some forms of life are valued more 
highly than others. As Judith Butler (2009) has observed in another 
context: “The problem is not merely how to include more people 
within existing norms, but to consider how existing norms allocate 
recognition differentially.  What new norms are possible, and how 
are they wrought?  What might be done to produce a more 
egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability?” (Butler, 2009, p. 
6). 
It strikes me that in the present moment we could learn 
something from the struggle for racial justice, not by analogizing 
today’s marriage movement to the fight against miscegenation 
laws, but by looking at what happened last time a previously 
reviled and disadvantaged group won the right to marry for the 
first time.  That’s what leads me to look into the immediate post 
Civil War regulation of freed peoples’ marriages.  I suspected that 
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that period might hold out some cautionary tales for us today.  And 
indeed it does. 
Even as I urge this analogy, I won’t argue that the racism 
experienced by the freedmen was the same as the homophobia or 
heterosexism gay and lesbian people experience today.  Nor could 
I even suggest that the institution of marriage is the same now as it 
was then.  That said, I think we can learn from the comparison of 
what it means to elaborate a new conception of freedom and 
equality through a form of state licensure.  Like same-sex couples 
today, the freed men and women experienced moving from 
outlaws to inlaws, from living outside the law to finding their 
private lives organized in both wonderful and perilous ways by and 
within law.  Being subject to legal regulation is always something 
to think carefully about.  The experiences of the freedmen suggest 
some caution with respect to whether, and if so how, rights – and 
specifically a right to marriage – will set you free.  Of course rights 
are something we cannot not want.  But our desire for rights is 
something we should indulge with an awareness that they come at 
a cost. 
In what follows I’ll highlight three principal concerns I 
have about the moral hazards associated with a civil rights struggle 
that prioritizes marriage rights.  Each of these concerns – marriage 
as a civilizing institution, the potential collapse of the right to 
marry into an obligation to do so, and the disciplinary effects of 
marriage meted out through criminal enforcement of adultery laws 
– was borne out in the experiences of newly emancipated former 
slaves when they won the right to marry in the 19th century, and is 
in play in the contemporary same-sex marriage movement.   
* * * 
 As early as 1774, enslaved people identified the inhumanity 
of slavery as lying, in significant part, in the inability to marry.  In 
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a petition to the new government of Massachusetts a group of 
enslaved men wrote: “[W]e are deprived of every thing that hath a 
tendency to make life even tolerable, the endearing ties of husband 
and wife we are strangers to for we are no longer man and wife 
than our masters or mistresses thinkes proper marred or onmarred.” 
(Davis, 1997, p. 109). Abolitionist Angelina Grimké (1837) argued 
that both positive and natural legal principles required that the 
United States “[n]o longer deny [African Americans] the right of 
marriage, but let every man have his own wife, and let every 
woman have her own husband.” (Hawkins,1972, pp. 61-63; 
Richards 1998).  In 1850, Henry Bibb, an enslaved man, observed: 
“I presume that there are no class of people in the United States 
who so highly appreciate the legality of marriage as those persons 
who have been held and treated as property.” (Bibb, 1850). 
Arguing in favor of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Illinois Senator 
Lyman Trumbull specifically identified the right to marry as a 
necessary aspect of citizenship. (Protection of Civil Rights, 1866).  
 Echoing contemporary arguments in favor of same-sex 
marriage, the right to marry figured prominently in the bundle of 
rights understood to have been denied to enslaved people, and was 
considered necessary to any robust conception of liberty. (Davis 
1997; Foner 1988; Grossberg 1985; Gutman, 1979; Malone 1992).  
Marriage “provided a way to establish the integrity of their 
relationships, to bring a new security to their family lives, and, to 
affirm their freedom . . . If the prohibition on marriage had 
underscored their dependent position and the precariousness of 
their family ties in slavery, the act of marriage now symbolized the 
rejection of their slave status.” (Edwards 1996, p. 101 ). Formerly 
enslaved people and abolitionists generally deemed the right to 
marry one of the most important ramifications of emancipation. 
 In countless ways, the role of marriage as part of what it 
meant for newly emancipated people to be free parallels the 
struggles of lesbian and gay people today.   Then as now the 
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inability to marry inflicted a stinging badge of inferiority on 
couples whose love, care and interdependence otherwise mirrored 
that of the couples who could legally marry.  In important ways for 
both groups, the incapacity to marry produced and reinforced their 
identity as a lower caste, and the struggle to win marriage rights 
figured at the top of the civil rights agenda to expand their equality 
and freedom as full citizens in modern society. 
 That said, the prominence of marriage as the lever by 
which both formerly enslaved people and lesbian and gay people 
might be elevated from their subordinate status has entailed 
noteworthy hazards that are worthy of better understanding.  
Marriage, then as now, has been a curious and complicated vehicle 
through which to address the injustice of racism and homophobia. 
MARRIAGE HAS ITS OWN AGENDA 
 Unlike other fora that have provided the setting for 
important civil rights struggles, such as lunch counters or public 
transportation, marriage is a particularly value-laden institution 
within which to lodge claims for full citizenship.  The same might 
be said of military service and even equal educational opportunity.  
But for present purposes, when claims for full citizenship are 
articulated though a demand for marriage rights, the 
disenfranchised group’s interest in equality and freedom must 
contend with the values of dignity, discipline, respectability and 
security which are entailed in the institution of marriage itself.   
Surely, exclusion from the institution of marriage inflicts a 
subordinating harm on those excluded.  Yet a demand that the 
exclusion be lifted in the name of equality and freedom must take 
account of the fact that marriage has its own, well-entrenched 
agenda.  
 The role of marriage in the lives of formerly enslaved 
people in the 1860s illustrates just what it means to elaborate a 
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notion of freedom through the values and commitments of 
marriage. 
 In its reports to the Secretary of War in the early 1860s, the 
American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission reflected the view 
dominant among whites at the time that Black people were 
uncivilized, degraded, undisciplined, and lived in wholly 
unchristian ways, and that the rule of law as well as patient 
guidance from whites would tame and civilize them.  Thus the 
Commission observed that “[t]he law, in the shape of military rule, 
takes for him the place of his master, with this difference – that he 
submits to it more heartily and cheerfully, without any sense of 
degradation.” (American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, 1863). 
Urging an active role for the federal government in the moral 
cultivation of Black character, the Commission's Final Report 
concluded on an optimistic note: “[T]hey will learn much and gain 
much from us.  They will gain in force of character, in mental 
cultivation, in self-reliance, in enterprise, in breadth of views and 
habits of generalization. Our influence over them, if we treat them 
well, will be powerful for good.” (American Freedmen’s Inquiry 
Commission, 1864). In support of this claim, the Commission 
referred to a Canadian high school principal who maintained that 
proximity to whites could even “whiten” Black people's 
“unattractive” physical features: “[c]olored people brought up 
among whites look better than others.  Their rougher, harsher 
features disappear.  I think that colored children brought up among 
white people look better than their parents.” (American 
Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission 1864).  
 Thus, federal officials acted as the guardians of the moral 
practices of Black people in order to qualify them for freedom and 
citizenship.  The enforcement of marriage laws was widely 
regarded as the best tool to accomplish these ends.  As Michael 
Grossberg (1985) notes, 
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[a]lthough their response to most black demands for legal 
rights was negative, southern whites readily granted the 
matrimonial request of their former charges.  The 
prevailing belief that marriage civilized and controlled the 
brutish nature of all people encouraged the use of formal 
matrimony as a remedy for the widespread immorality and 
promiscuity that whites believed to prevail among blacks. 
(Grossberg 1985, p. 133). 
Much of the rhetoric of the time related to the need to civilize the 
freed men and women.  Herbert Gutman summarized these beliefs 
as follows: “As slaves, after all, their marriages had not been 
sanctioned by the civil law and therefore ‘the sexual passion’ went 
unrestrained.” White officials informed the freed people that “[t]he 
loose ideas which have prevailed among you on this subject must 
cease,” (Edwards, 1996, p. 93),1 and that “no race of mankind can 
be expected to become exalted in the scale of humanity, whose 
sexes, without any binding obligation, cohabit promiscuously 
together.” (Edwards, 1996, p. 93).2  
 Many African American people were acutely aware of the 
symbolic role that marriage played in the transformation of their 
status from slave to citizen.  Northern Black elites were often as 
judgmental as whites when it came to the practices of poor Blacks.  
Laura Edwards (1997) notes that 
[m]any African-American leaders were quite aware 
that white northerners and southerners alike used 
marriage as a barometer of their people’s fitness for 
freedom, and they urged poor blacks to adopt the 
domestic patterns common among elite whites.  
This, they argued, would help convince the nation 
that ex-slaves deserved the rights and privileges of 
freedom. (Edwards 1997, p. 56). 
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In support of this effort, one African American leader, James H. 
Harris, argued, “[L]et us do nothing to re-kindle the slumbering 
fires of prejudice between the two races.  Remember, we are on 
trial before the tribunal of the nation and of the world, that it may 
be known . . . whether we are worthy to be a free, self-governing 
people.” (Edwards 1997, p. 56).3 
 As such, the work of transforming formerly enslaved 
people into citizens may not have been left to the state alone.  The 
task of discipline and punishment for those who kept up the old 
ways was taken up by Black people themselves.  Dan Johnson, it 
appears, did not consider marrying the woman with whom he had 
lived for many years until he sought to become a member of the St. 
John's Lodge of Odd Fellows in 1868.  After his death, his widow 
applied for a war widow’s pension, and one witness testified that 
“they were living together in adultery at the time he petitioned to 
become a member . . . . [T]he Lodge would not let him join until 
he married.” (Pension File of Dan Johnson, 15).  
 Colored newspapers also played a role in encouraging 
African American people to understand their responsibilities 
relative to the marriage relation.  The Savannah Tribune, formerly 
The Colored Tribune, printed an editorial in November 1876 
strongly counseling Black women against “Marrying in Haste”: 
Do not place yourself habitually in the society of 
any suitor until you have decided the question of 
marriage; human wills are weak, and people often 
become bewildered and do not know their error 
until it is too late . . . . A promise may be made in a 
moment of sympathy, or even half delirious ecstasy, 
which must be redeemed through years of sorrow 
and pain. (“Marrying in haste,” p. 4).  
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In like fashion, the Semi-Weekly Louisianan cautioned its readers 
to consider the sanctity and magnitude of the marital obligation so 
as to avoid a wedding being a “sudden and unconsidered thing – 
the freak or the passion of an excited hour.” (“Hasty marriages and 
divorces,” p. 1). 
 These examples show that by the mid-1870s some African 
Americans were performing within and serving Victorian cultural 
institutions, at once evidencing their own successful domestication 
and regulating those who did not conform to larger cultural norms 
relating to sex, gender, and sexuality.  For some, conformity to 
these norms was a price paid instrumentally for the respect they 
believed it would buy.  For others, no doubt, this was what it meant 
to be a freed, if not free, person.  Freedom and citizenship entailed 
a wide range of self-discipline. 
 Do we have reason to worry that marriage will operate as a 
civilizing institution for lesbians and gay men today as it did for 
newly emancipated people in the nineteenth century?  Are the 
Victorian values that structured marriage rights then no longer with 
us today?  Well, there may be some reason for concern today as 
same-sex couples make the case that they have a right to marry.   
After the devastating loss that was the Supreme Court’s Bowers v. 
Hardwick decision in 1986, the lesbian and gay community 
understood that it had work to do. It had not made itself 
recognizable to the public and to legal authorities as a community 
worthy of full constitutional protection and the dignity that 
recognition would confer. 
 So that work began. On school boards, on little league 
fields, at PTA meetings, in churches, workplaces, grocery stores – 
everywhere.  Lesbians and gay men set out to demonstrate in fora 
both quotidian and extraordinary that they were not a perverse 
Other, but rather that they were respectable citizens, that they were 
just like everyone else.  It is important to understand the turn this 
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work took.  The project was not one of sexual liberation, as had 
been the approach of the early Stonewall activists, of “live and let 
live,” or “keep your laws off our bodies.”   This was not a politics 
of neutrality or sexual liberty, nor did it echo the kind of liberal 
arguments made by H.L.A. Hart in his debates with Lord Patrick 
Devlin about the legitimacy of criminalizing sodomy.4  Rather the 
gay politics of the 1990s took a decidedly normative turn in favor 
of demonstrating to a skeptical American public that gay men and 
lesbians were normal, respectable, and responsible citizens, not the 
perverts that Chief Justice Burger had described in Bowers.   In 
short, the shame of Bowers was met with a politics of redemption.  
 This work paid off in the Supreme Court’s reversal of 
Bowers in the Lawrence v. Texas decision wherein Justice 
Kennedy, writing for a slim majority, wrote that the Texas sodomy 
statute “demeans the lives of homosexual persons,” they “are 
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean 
their existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, p. 578) He 
then repeated soaring language that had been used in an earlier 
abortion rights case:  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.”5  The moralizing of Bowers that left 
a homosexual minority vulnerable to the disgust and judgment of 
the majority was not replaced in Lawrence with a rule respecting 
sexual freedom or even sexual orientation-based equality, but 
rather Justice Kennedy gave the boot to the Bowers’ Court’s strong 
negative moral visions by substituting his own moral reasoning 
grounded in an almost spiritual reverence for the dignity of the 
human and a call that the law respect the most intimate choices 
each person makes about the meaning of their lives. 
 This turn to morality, respectability and the dignity of the 
person as the core value that now animates gay rights litigation set 
the stage for the marriage cases to come.   Perry v. 
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Schwarzenegger, the case challenging the California proposition 
that amended the state’s constitution to limit marriage to one man 
and one woman (Proposition 8) perhaps best illustrates the degree 
to which gay men and lesbians’ right to marry is now being 
articulated through the values and vernacular of interests that 
marriage holds dear, more so than the values that the gay 
community has traditionally treasured, such as sexual liberty, 
diversity, autonomy and freedom.  The testimony by the four 
plaintiffs in the Proposition 8 trial, two men and two women, 
focused primarily on their desire for respectability, their longing 
for the sacred blessing and societal recognition that marriage 
confers, on the fact that being married would be better for raising 
children, and finally on the disgrace of exile from the sacred 
domain of marriage.  On top of that, they argued that the state 
should play a vital role in promoting the institution of marriage and 
that including same-sex couples in the institution would be good 
for marriage more generally. 
 When asked by Ted Olson, one the of the gay couples’ 
lawyers: “Have you encountered instances where because you are 
not married you were placed in embarrassing or awkward 
situations?”, Jeff Zarrillo, one of the plaintiffs, testified: “One 
example is when Paul and I travel, it's always an awkward 
situation at the front desk at the hotel.  The individual working at 
the desk will look at us with a perplexed look on his face and say, 
“You ordered a king-size bed.  Is that really what you want?”  Or 
“It is always an awkward situation walking to the bank and saying, 
“My partner and I want to open a joint bank account,” hearing, you 
know, "Is it a business account?  It would be a lot easier to be able 
to say: “My husband and I are here to check into a room.  My 
husband and I are here to open a bank account.” (Zarrillo 
Testimony, p. 84)  
 When asked by Mr. Olsen about why they haven’t had 
children, Mr. Zarrillo said: “Paul and I believe that in order to have 
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children it would be important for us to be married. It would make 
it easier for -- for us, for our children, to explain our relationship, 
for our children to be able to explain our relationship.” (Zarrillo 
Testimony, pp. 81-82) 
 Mr. Olsen then asked Mr. Zarrillo why he and his partner 
were not domestic partners – the California domestic partnership 
law confers on same-sex couples all of the legal and economic 
benefits of marriage, just under a different legal name.  Zarrillo 
answered: “we hold marriage in such high regard … Domestic 
partnership would not give due respect to the relationship that we 
have had for almost nine years.  Only a marriage could do that.” 
(Zarrillo Testimony pp. 82-83) 
 That the values that motivate much of today’s same-sex 
marriage movement share common ground with the efforts to 
secure marriage rights for newly freed people in the 19th century is 
perhaps no better illustrated than by a short piece Ted Olson wrote 
to explain why he was joining the Proposition 8 challenge as co-
counsel with David Boies.  In “The Conservative Case for Gay 
Marriage” Olson wrote: 
Many of my fellow conservatives have an almost knee-jerk 
hostility toward gay marriage. This does not make sense, 
because same-sex unions promote the values conservatives 
prize. Marriage is one of the basic building blocks of our 
neighborhoods and our nation. At its best, it is a stable 
bond between two individuals who work to create a loving 
household and a social and economic partnership. We 
encourage couples to marry because the commitments they 
make to one another provide benefits not only to 
themselves but also to their families and communities. 
Marriage requires thinking beyond one's own needs. It 
transforms two individuals into a union based on shared 
aspirations, and in doing so establishes a formal investment 
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in the well-being of society. The fact that individuals who 
happen to be gay want to share in this vital social 
institution is evidence that conservative ideals enjoy 
widespread acceptance. Conservatives should celebrate 
this, rather than lament it. (Olson, 2010). 
In important ways the success of today’s marriage-rights 
movement is premised upon a promise of disciple, respectability, 
and obeisance to a set of civilizing norms that portray those who 
fall short of those norms as an embarrassment, or worse, 
undeserving of the full and equal blessings of civic belonging.   
The African American community has paid dearly for the “failure” 
of many of its members to form respectable families, the 
Moynihan Report being only one salient example thereof. (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 1965). I worry that we will witness an 
increasing divide in the gay community as well: between those 
who bend their lives toward marriage’s expectations and are 
rewarded therefore, and those who do not or cannot and suffer a 
price as a result.   
A RIGHT TO MARRY COLLAPSING INTO AN OBLIGATION TO DO SO 
 Without question the right to marry figured prominently in 
the minds of newly emancipated Black people in the U.S. South as 
they imagined what it meant to be free.  The ability to order their 
private lives with spouses of their own choice, and to protect their 
families from the wrenching separation created by their sale and 
other forms of exploitation by hostile outsiders was among the first 
aspects of freedom on which the freed people insisted.  As such, 
the right to marry not only signaled the new capacity of Black 
people to enter into civil contracts which were binding upon 
themselves and others, but it also held out a form of security which 
newly freed people imagined would erect legal pickets around their 
families to protect them from the malevolent interference of white 
people.   
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 Many freed people naively thought that the freedom to 
marry meant a freedom to marry according to their own rules and 
customs and in family formations of their own choosing free from 
white interference. (Franke, 1999). What they quickly found, 
however, was that with this new right the freedom to marry 
collapsed in short order into an obligation to do so according to an 
inflexible definition set out in existing laws.  For some time prior 
to the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau in 1865, federal 
officers played a significant role in the promotion of marriage 
among Black people.  In 1862, John Eaton was appointed by 
General Grant to set up what were termed “contraband camps,” 
settlements that housed Black fugitives in Tennessee and northern 
Mississippi.  In April 1863, Eaton reported that “all entering our 
camps who have been living or desire to live together as husband 
and wife are required to be married in the proper manner . . . This 
regulation has done much to promote the good order of the camp.” 
(Eaton, 1863, pp. 89-90).  In March 1864, the Secretary of War 
made Eaton's regulation official United States policy, and ordered 
Freedmen's Bureau agents to “solemnize the rite of marriage 
among Freedmen.” (Order from Edwin Stanton 1864; Gutman 
1979).  Thereafter, superintendents of the contraband camps 
uniformly observed that “the introduction of the rite of Christian 
marriage and requiring its strict observance, exerted a most 
wholesome influence upon the order of the camps and the conduct 
of the people.” (Report by Chaplain Warren, 1864). Recall that the 
people seeking entrance to these camps, which today we would 
call refugee camps, were in many cases suffering from starvation, 
illness, and the other effects of abuse by their “owners.”  That the 
officers administering the camps saw the ennobling influence of 
marriage as the most pressing need of the immiserated fleeing 
slaves is quite remarkable. 
After emancipation, formerly enslaved people traveled 
great distances and endured enormous hardships in order to reunite 
families that had been separated under slavery. Shortly after the 
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end of the war, southern states acted quickly to amend their 
constitutions or enact statutes validating marriages begun under 
slavery.  Laws that simply legitimized slave marriages if the 
couple were cohabiting as husband and wife when the law went 
into effect were quite common. Mississippi's 1865 civil rights law 
was typical: “All freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes, who do 
now and have heretofore lived and cohabited together as husband 
and wife shall be taken and held in law as legally married.” (Civil 
Rights Act of Nov. 25, 1865, Ch. 4, § 2, 1865 Miss. Laws 82, 82.)6  
Some states took a different approach to the marriage of 
former slaves, giving “all colored inhabitants of this State claiming 
to be living together in the relation of husband and wife . . . and 
who shall mutually desire to continue in that relation,” nine months 
to formally re-marry one another before a minister or civil 
authority. (Act of Jan. 11, 1866, 31). These laws further required 
newly married couples to file a marriage license with the county 
circuit court, a bureaucratic detail that carried a prohibitively high 
price for many freed people.  In every state with such laws, failure 
to comply with these requirements while continuing to cohabit 
would render the offenders subject to criminal prosecution for 
adultery and fornication.  North Carolina gave the freed people just 
under six months to register their marriages with the county clerk.  
Each month they failed to do so constituted a distinct and 
separately prosecutable criminal offense.  
While many formerly enslaved people merely allowed the 
law to operate upon them, automatically legitimizing their 
marriages, others “swamped public officials with demands to 
validate old and new unions.” (Grossberg 1985, p. 134). Mass 
wedding ceremonies in the postwar South sometimes involved 
seventy couples; in seventeen North Carolina counties in 1866, 
9000 marriages were registered (Litwak, 1979) Thus, the right to 
marry for African Americans in the immediate postbellum period 
had both symbolic and practical significance--symbolic in the 
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sense that enjoyment of the right signaled acceptance into the 
moral community of civil society, and practical to the extent that 
social and economic benefits flowed from being legally married. 
However, the right to marry was not merely an 
unconstrained liberty enjoyed by African Americans independent 
of state interest or control.  Even prior to the end of the war, state 
and federal officials played an active role in impressing upon 
Black people the responsibilities, rather than the rights, that 
marriage imposed.   
After emancipation, when formerly enslaved people 
struggled to reunify relationships shattered by slavery, the first 
husband might reappear and expect his wife to live with him as his 
spouse.  So too, many women had had children with more than one 
man and, after emancipation, sought to unify these complex family 
formations.  Thus, many formerly enslaved people found 
themselves with two or more spouses and with complex, blended 
families at the end of the war (Gutman 1979).7   Given that bigamy 
was a crime in every state, persons with multiple spouses were 
forced to choose one and only one legal spouse and to cease 
intimate relations and/or cohabitation with others (Bernard 1996, 
pp. 10-11). Georgia's 1866 law relating to “Persons of Color” set 
forth the following:  [P]ersons of color, now living together as 
husband and wife, are hereby declared to sustain that legal relation 
to each other, unless a man shall have two or more reputed wives, 
or a woman two or more reputed husbands. In such an event, the 
man, immediately after the passage of this Act by the General 
Assembly, shall select one of his reputed wives, with her consent; 
or the woman one of her reputed husbands, with his consent; and 
the ceremony of marriage between these two shall be performed 
(1866 Ga. Laws 239, 240). The statute then instructed that persons 
who fail or refuse to comply with these requirements were to be 
prosecuted for fornication, adultery, or both. South Carolina 
imposed a similar statutory duty of election. (1865 S.C. Acts 291, 
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292). Even though some state laws were silent on the question of 
multiple spouses, state and federal officials forced freed men and 
women to choose one and only one spouse as a matter of practice. 
In some cases where a freed man or woman was unwilling or 
unable to choose, Bureau agents felt free to do so for them. An 
agent in North Carolina reported that “[w]henever a negro appears 
before me with two or three wives who have equal claim upon him 
. . . I marry him to the woman who had the greatest number of 
helpless children who otherwise would become a charge on the 
Bureau”(Litwack 1979, p. 242; Gutman 1979).  
The manner in which newly emancipated Black people in 
the United States managed the right to marry offers several lessons 
for today with respect to the risk that a right to marry can collapse 
into an obligation to do so for lesbians and gay men.  Just as newly 
freed people expected that the right to marry would include a 
recognition of the complex families they had formed outside of 
legal marriage, so too lesbian and gay people have been surprised 
to discover the ways in which winning the right to marry has 
diminished the rights they had enjoyed as domestic partners, co-
habitating partners, or in other non-marital family forms.   
Consider the following: 
When the state of Connecticut amended its marriage law in 
2009 to allow same-sex couples to marry, the law automatically 
married all of the same-sex couples who had entered into civil 
unions in Connecticut or in neighboring states, such as Vermont, 
without providing those couples adequate notice or giving them an 
option to remain in a civil union (Public Act No. 09-13 Sec. 12(a), 
2009). While this provision of the new law was likely intended to 
be a benevolent blessing on same-sex couples by conferring full 
marital status upon those couples who had entered into civil unions 
during a period when they could not marry, it presumed i) that civil 
unions are an inferior civil marital status, and ii) that all of the 
couples in civil unions wanted to be married,  It seemed 
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unthinkable to the drafters of the Connecticut marriage equality 
law that some couples might prefer a civil union over a marriage. 
Thus, in some cases, same-sex couples have found themselves to 
be automatically married in circumstances very similar to that of 
freed people in the nineteenth century.  As a woman recently wrote 
me in response to an Op-ed I had published in the New York 
Times (Franke 2011): 
 “I purposely did NOT get a civil union in 
Connecticut when they recognized civil unions, and didn’t 
even know that my Vermont civil union turned into a 
marriage when Connecticut then recognized those civil 
unions as marriages.  The VT CU was largely to support 
the general movement.  I knew it expressly did not mean 
anything in Connecticut. I find myself in the unfortunate 
and unanticipated position of going through divorce 
proceedings having never been married.” 
These sentiments, written by a well-educated woman in 2011, 
echo the incredulity expressed by freed men and women who 
had no idea that they had to follow formal divorce proceedings 
to dissolve their marriages after they had been automatically 
married by operation of law. 
What is more, same-sex couples are finding that they must 
marry in order to retain rights they had previously enjoyed without 
being married, such as employment-related health insurance 
coverage for one’s partner.  Immediately on the heels of the New 
York State legislature amending the state’s marriage law to include 
same-sex couples several large employers announced that their gay 
and lesbian employees would have to marry to continue coverage 
for their partners.  Never mind that New York City has a domestic 
partnership law (which covers both same and different sex 
couples) and that many public and private employers had deemed 
domestic partnership registration a sufficient bureaucratic filter for 
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benefits eligibility. Here, as in other ways, the right to marry has 
rendered alternatives to marriage less viable and less secure.  A 
right to marry has collapsed into an obligation to do so.  
 DISCIPLINARY EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE, REAL AND ANTICIPATED 
 Marriage laws provide a form of economic and legal 
security for those who qualify, but they also include a set of 
expectations that are enforced through both civil and criminal laws.  
Exclusivity, sexual fidelity, and duties of support are some of the 
most important, but not the only, rules of marriage that ones 
spouse and public prosecutors are empowered to enforce.   Newly 
freed people learned quickly that the right to marry brought with it 
the risk of severe sanction in the event that marriages rules were 
not followed.  Indeed, these rules offered both racist public 
officials and judgmental members of the African American 
community itself a tool with which to punish anyone who got 
caught violating marriages rules.    For a significant number of 
former slaves, mostly men, legal marriage was not experienced as 
a source of validation and empowerment, but as discipline and 
punishment when the rigid rules of legal marriage were 
transgressed, often unintentionally.  Recall that in most states the 
automatic marriage statutes were accompanied by a provision 
requiring the freedpeople to choose one and only one spouse if the 
reunion of formerly fractured families left an individual  married to 
more than one person.  If a man, for instance, failed to make such a 
selection and continued to cohabit with two women, he would be 
considered married to neither, while at the same time vulnerable to 
a fornication prosecution.  This is exactly what happened to Sam 
Means.  A Georgia jury convicted him of fornication upon a 
finding that Means, “a negro man, was living with two women as 
his reputed wives, and had never selected either and made her his 
lawful wife, as required by the [1866] act.” (Means, 1896).  
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 Southern judges stepped in after a period to address this 
unhappy situation, and, as the following cases demonstrate, the 
technical requirements of marriage laws were enforced 
uncompromisingly against African Americans, regardless of 
whether they were shown to have understood the details or 
implications of this new regulatory regime. In Williams v. Georgia 
(1881), the male defendant, whose first name is never mentioned 
by the court, was shown to have been married to Elizabeth 
Williams when they were both enslaved.  They were separated by 
their master and sold to different owners, but were reunited on 
December 21, 1864, two months after General Sherman marched 
to the sea.  Thereafter, Elizabeth “associated immorally with 
another, and the defendant quit her and married another woman.”  
Since Williams had reunited with Elizabeth before March 9, 1866 
(the effective date of the act legitimizing pre-existing slave 
marriages) and did not “quit” her until after that date, he was 
determined to have been legally married to Elizabeth when he 
married his second wife. The court rejected the defendant's 
argument that he did not intend his cohabitation with Elizabeth in 
1866 to amount to a legal marriage. Instead the court ruled that the 
1866 Act married the couple and that “[h]is wife was unfaithful; he 
got mad and married again without divorce.  Being a free citizen, 
he must act like one, carrying the burdens, if he so considers them, 
as well as enjoying the privileges of his new condition.” 
 Other freed men and women found themselves in legal 
jeopardy when they knowingly complied with the legal 
requirements pertaining to the creation of a marriage, but persisted 
in the old ways by refusing to dissolve their marriages according to 
the technical requirements of divorce. In 1867, Celia McConico 
married David Hartwell. After two and a half years of marriage, 
they “mutually agreed to separate and did then separate from each 
other as husband and wife” (McConico 1873). A year later 
McConico married Edom Jacobs and was thereafter prosecuted for 
bigamy.  At trial McConico argued that since Alabama's 1867 law 
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automatically solemnized pre-existing slave marriages without 
legal formalities, she assumed she was able to dissolve her 
marriage without legal formality.  An Alabama jury convicted her 
of bigamy and the court sentenced her to two years in the state 
penitentiary.  Her conviction and sentence were affirmed by the 
Alabama Supreme Court.  
 Living as marriage rights-holders was thus a complicated 
matter for African Americans in the second half of the 19th 
century.  Marriage held out both security and danger, as they found 
themselves in a new regulatory relationship with the state.  These 
regulations both secured their families and provided opportunity 
for public officials, scorned lovers, and judgmental members of the 
community8 to invoke the laws of fornication, adultery and bigamy 
to discipline and punish those who transgressed the rules of 
marriage.  Conviction under these laws carried a heavy penalty, 
usually a felony, thereby disenfranchising those men found guilty 
and often subjecting them to the crushingly harsh, sometimes 
deadly, convict leasing system. (Franke, 1999, pp. 305-307). 
 I have no evidence to suggest that public prosecutors in 
New York are about to ramp up adultery prosecutions against 
married gay men or lesbians who are unable to live up to their 
vows of monogamy.9  But I can imagine a scenario in, say, upstate 
New York where a local official who opposes the marriage rights 
of same-sex couples decides to take the seldom enforced criminal 
statute prohibiting adultery very seriously, and initiates a 
prosecution against a married lesbian or gay man who has had sex 
with someone not their legal spouse, just as we saw in the post-
bellum period with African Americans.  After all, Dan Savage, a 
prominent gay journalist and political activist, has argued in the 
New York Times Magazine, to the outrage of many, that marital 
infidelity is a virtue (Oppenheimer	   2011)  So too, it is not 
unthinkable that a cuckolded spouse, acting out of hurt or revenge, 
might find a willing partner in the local district attorney’s office.  
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This is exactly the scenario that launched the prosecution in 
Lawrence v. Texas, the 2006 Supreme Court case that invalidated 
laws criminalizing consensual sex between two adult persons of 
the same sex in private. (Carpenter 2004).10   
* * * 
 Some commentators have resisted the analogy between the 
civil rights movement today for lesbian and gay people and that of 
African Americans in the United States.  To some degree they are 
no doubt right.  Homophobia and racism are not equivalent forms 
of social, legal and political disadvantage.  Their sources and their 
consequences are quite different.  So too, the disadvantage and 
hatred that gay and lesbian people have suffered cannot in any way 
be analogized to “the badges and incidents of slavery.”  Our 
histories of oppression are in so many ways incommensurable.  
 That incommensurability does not, however, disable us 
from gaining lessons from one another’s experience of oppression 
and of expanded equality and freedom.  For both African 
Americans and gay people,11 the right to marry has figured 
prominently in ongoing struggles for full rights as citizens.  Given 
the prominence of marriage in both public and private civil life, it 
makes sense that exclusion from civil marriage has been 
understood as a significant form of social disadvantage, both 
materially and symbolically.  Yet using marriage as the primary 
container for the advancement of a community’s claims for full 
equality and citizenship brings with it significant moral hazards.  
Those hazards, to my mind, have not been sufficiently addressed in 
today’s movement to secure marriage rights for same-sex couples.  
Those hazards might be better confronted and ameliorated were we 
to take seriously the lessons to be learned from the experiences of 
African Americans when first able to marry in the immediate post 
Civil War period.  For them, as for us today, we ought to tread 
carefully in securing the right to marry.  Surely it is a right we 
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cannot not want, but without critically engaging that desire we risk 
rendering more vulnerable significant sectors of our community 
who cannot or will not conform to marriage’s rules and discipline.  
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1 Quoting Alfred M. Waddell, a Confederate army officer and 
newspaper editor. 
2 Quoting a member of the Commission that designed the North 
Carolina Black Codes. See also Stampp 1956, p. 12. 
3 Immediately after the war, Federal Freedmen's Bureau officers 
also compiled lists of exemplary African American men who 
might be appointed to various political offices in the military 
governments set up by the Bureau after Congress passed the first 
Reconstruction Act. See Lowe, 1993, p. 989. Lowe (1993) argues 
that the “black men who, in [the Bureau's] opinion, had 
demonstrated some ability and capacity for leadership in the two 
years since the end of slavery,” were more than likely light-
skinned. (Lowe, 1993, p. 992). Bureau agents explicitly disfavored 
“black men who had already established a reputation for alienating 
the native white community.” (Lowe, 1993, p. 995). Thus, Lowe 
concludes, the “black leaders” listed by Bureau officers were not, 
in many cases, the people whom the Black community would have 
identified had they been asked. Here, as elsewhere, the freedmen 
who won the praises of white military and civilian authorities 
served as examples against which “bad blacks” were unfavorably 
compared for refusing to play within the bounds of white 
supremacy and Victorian ideology. (Lowe, 1993). 
4	  Hart’s view turned on the application of the harm principle: if no 
one is harmed by the practice the state has no legitimate reason to 
regulate or criminalize it. Hart, H.L.A. (1959, July 30); Devlin, P. 
(1965). 	  
5	  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, at 574 (2003) (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992)).	  
6 Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia passed 
similar laws during this period. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 9, 1866, tit. 
31, § 5, 1866 Ga. Laws 239, 240 (prescribing and regulating the 
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relation of husband and wife between persons of color); Act of 
Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, §§ 1-5, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 99-101 
(concerning negroes and persons of color or of mixed blood); Act 
of 1865, 1865 S.C. Acts 291, 292 (establishing and regulating the 
domestic relations of persons of color, and amending the law in 
relation to paupers and vagrancy); Act of Feb. 27, 1865, ch. 18, § 
2, 1865 Va. Acts 85 (legalizing marriages of colored persons now 
cohabitating as husband and wife), in Guild, J.P., 1996, (p. 33.); 
see also Howard, 1866, (p. 179) (a collection of Black Laws 
assembled by the head of the Freedman's Bureau and submitted to 
Congress in 1866-67). 
7 Gutman (1979) describes how in some cases women who 
emerged from slavery with more than one husband would choose a 
legal husband based upon a number of different factors, such as the 
man's wealth, or the man's willingness to provide for all of her 
children, even those fathered by other men. Gutman, 1979, pp. 
423-425. Litwack (1979) describes how some women chose to 
reunite with their first husbands, to whom they felt a special moral 
connection because their marriages had ended due to the forced 
separation of the couple. Ex-slave Jane Ferguson chose to reunite 
with her first husband, Martin Barnwell, even though she had 
married a man named Ferguson after her master had sold away 
Barnwell: “I told [Ferguson] I never 'spects Martin could come 
back, but if he did he would be my husband above all others.” 
8	  	  Often	  bigamy	  or	  fornication	  prosecutions	  were	  initiated	  not	  
by	  racist	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  but	  by	  members	  of	  the	  
Black	  community	  against	  their	  neighbors.	  	  While	  we	  can’t	  
know	  for	  sure	  why	  newly	  freed	  people	  turned	  each	  other	  in	  to	  
local	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  when	  they	  failed	  to	  follow	  the	  
formal	  rules	  of	  marriage	  and	  divorce,	  we	  can	  supposed	  that	  
they	  were	  acting	  to	  get	  even	  for	  other	  slights	  or	  insults,	  or	  they	  
were	  concerned	  about	  protecting	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  Black	  
community	  more	  generally.	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9 Adultery remains a misdemeanor in New York State, although it 
is rarely enforced. See New York State Penal Law Art. 255.17, “A 
person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse 
with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the 
other person has a living spouse.” 
10 Carpenter’s description of Lawrence and Garner’s “relationship” 
is quite different from that portrayed by Kennedy’s opinion.  The 
two men, Lawrence white and Garner black, were not in a 
relationship, but were more likely occasional sex partners.  The 
night of the arrest another sex partner of Garner’s called the police 
to report that “a black man was going crazy” in Lawrence’s 
apartment “and he was armed with a gun.”  (Carpenter notes that a 
racial epithet rather than “black man” was probably the term used.)  
The police arrived at the apartment and found Lawrence and 
Garner having sex.  
11 By this phrasing I do not mean to imply that all African 
Americans are heterosexual or that no gay people are African 
American.  Rather I am referring to the movements on behalf of 
these communities that, for better or worse, tend to isolate one 
aspect of identity as the animating subject of their civil rights 
struggles. 
